As documented by a BLET member, Trip Optimizer’s handling of a train caused excessive slack action, which resulted in a violent separation that ripped out this drawbar and initiated an emergency brake application.
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As reported in March, the BLET filed extensive comments with the Federal Railroad Administration raising questions about CSXT’s use and implementation of Trip Optimizer/Air Brake Control (TO/ABC, or “zero-to-zero”) technology.
Included in BLET’s filing were field reports from locomotive engineers who documented their first-hand experiences with Trip Optimizer system failures. Many noted that TO routinely fails to integrate with Positive Train Control.
Other important observations included:
- One engineer documented that TO stopped working when a locomotive’s microwave oven was in use.
- Another engineer documented how TO’s train handling caused excessive slack action, which resulted in a violent separation that ripped out an entire drawbar and draft gear from the cushioning mechanism of the car, and initiated an emergency application of the brakes.
- One engineer perhaps summarized it best: “The fact the system still ‘freezes’ or constantly loses communication with the locomotive… should show that it is not ready for such advanced testing. In fact, the system as a whole should be the topic of great scrutiny by regulators before being advanced further.”
Zero-to-zero is an extension of TO. If fully approved, CSXT’s Product Safety Plan (PSP) would allow the zero-to-zero software to completely control a train’s air, independent, and dynamic braking systems. In other words, the software would operate and control the train’s movements — not a certified locomotive engineer.
In its comments, the BLET called upon the FRA to hold a public hearing on zero-to-zero to accept testimony from all stakeholders and the general public, which would likely result in additional reports such as those referenced above. BLET concluded: “Throughout these comments, we have made it clear that it is our position that TO/ ABC is unsafe and should not be approved for deployment. The BLET exists to protect and preserve the safety of our members. The TO/ ABC — zero-to-zero — software as it is currently being included with the PSP will not improve safety. The FRA should reject this product safety plan.”
A PDF of the BLET’s complete filing with FRA can be found on the National Division website.