By Richard M. McCord
Chairman, Locomotive Engineer Review Board
Federal Railroad Administration
In 1997 the Federal Railroad Administration issued a new regulation to require the use of two-way end-of-train (EOT) telemetry devices. At the time the regulation was issued, FRA had identified eleven accidents, which might have been prevented had the trains been equipped with two-way EOTs. There have been modifications to the EOT rules since then.
In my almost 30 years of FRA experience, I can remember several accidents that could have been avoided or at least minimized by the use of a two-way EOT being utilized in emergency. Several accidents, including the two accidents that occurred in Cajon, California, in 1994 and 1996 as well as an accident that occurred in 1996 near St. Paul, Minnesota, were referenced in the preamble to the 1997 regulation as examples of what FRA was trying to prevent. The accident near St. Paul destroyed a building where I had been present many times during my FRA career.
However, perhaps my clearest memory of an incident which did not result in an accident but which could have been far less stressful for the crew, was of a runaway due to a defective angle cock. It was possible for the angle cock to be closed and still appear to be in the open position. The crew was on a downgrade for several miles operating at 60 mph and approaching a 15 mph speed restriction. The restriction was a tight curve on a bridge. The engineer applied the brakes, handled his train properly, and the train continued to accelerate. The engineer placed the train in emergency and the train slowed but still crossed the bridge at a speed far in excess of the maximum allowable. The defective valve was found during the FRA investigation that followed, and more defective valves were found, many in new-parts bins. Had the engineer had a two-way EOT, and used it, it could have prevented the runaway.
The focus of the two-way EOT regulation was to reduce the risk of this type of accident or incident by providing the locomotive engineer with the ability to initiate an emergency brake application at the rear of the train. That regulation later required the engineer to use the two-way EOT in the case of an emergency.
The Requirement
Section 232.407(f)(3) (in effect since May 2001), requires the activation of the EOT emergency brake application feature whenever it becomes necessary for a crew to initiate an emergency brake application from the automatic brake valve or conductor’s emergency brake valve. Failure to comply is a violation of the Power Brake Regulations. In two recent UP collisions, San Antonio, Texas, and Gurdon, Arkansas, the engineer failed to activate the toggle switch on the EOT when the train was placed in emergency with the automatic brake valve. In either case, I’m not sure it would have prevented the collision, but it’s something to keep in mind when conducting investigations; it might have mitigated or minimized the results of the accident.
Section 232.407 (f)(3) states as follows: “The device shall be activated to effectuate an emergency brake application either by using the manual toggle switch or through automatic activation, whenever it becomes necessary for the locomotive engineer to initiate an emergency application of the air brakes using either the automatic brake valve or the conductor’s emergency brake valve.”
All engineers know that placing a train’s air brakes in emergency from the head end can result in a derailment. The slack can run in toward the locomotive and cause severe lateral-over-vertical forces. With the right combination of cars, that can be catastrophic. Placing the air brake handle in the emergency position is the normal, the trained response (we have all been there); it may not be the response that will result in the best consequences. By using the two-way EOT in combination with the automatic brake valve to initiate the emergency application, the train begins braking from both ends of the train, maintaining the slack instead of bunching it. In addition using the EOT in combination with the brake valve might also provide a quicker stop. Specifically, the air would release from both ends of the train line and cars at the rear would be in emergency earlier than if the emergency application was applied at the head end only.
As a side note, locomotives ordered after August 1, 2001, or placed in service for the first time after August 1, 2003, are required to have a feature that automatically activates an emergency application from the EOT whenever the automatic brake valve or conductor’s valve is placed in emergency. Some railroads have retrofitted older locomotives with an automatic activation feature.
The concept of thinking of the EOT at the time of the emergency in combination with the automatic brake valve requires a change of mind-set for many engineers. Training required for operating employees under the new Freight Power Brake Rule, which was fully effective as of April 1, 2004, should have included emphasis on this topic. Engineers can safeguard themselves and their trains by thinking through how to react when it is necessary to place the train in emergency. The positive end result would be a quicker stop and better control of in-train forces.
Think about it.
(Editor’s Note: Richard M. McCord works for the FRA as Chairman of the Locomotive Engineer Review Board. His railroad career began as a fireman for the Norfolk and Western Railway in 1968. He earned promotion to locomotive engineer in May of 1973 and held that position until 1975 when he went to work for the Federal Railroad Administration. Over the years, he has served the FRA as an Inspector, Training Officer-Operating Practices, Regional Administrator and Field Director of Railroad Safety Programs.)