CLEVELAND, May 8 — The National Transportation Safety Board has determined that crew member fatigue was a major cause of a fatal rear-end collision involving a BNSF coal train and a standing maintenance of way equipment train in Red Oak, Iowa, that occurred on April 17, 2011.
Killed in the accident were BLET Division 642 President Tom Anderson, 48, and his conductor, UTU member Patricia Hyatt.
“Once again, this investigation draws attention to the dangers of human fatigue,” National Transportation Safety Board Chairman Deborah Hersman said in a statement. “The human body is not designed to work irregular schedules, especially during the circadian trough, when our bodies are at their lowest alertness.”
At its April 24 hearing in Washington, D.C., the NTSB determined that both crew members were asleep at the time of the accident. Representing the BLET at the hearing were Carl Fields, Coordinator of the Safety Task Force (STF), and Dan Lauzon, a STF Primary Investigator.
“The striking coal train conductor’s and the engineer’s irregular work schedules contributed to their being fatigued on the morning of the collision,” the NSTB concluded. “Based on the conductor’s and the engineer’s irregular work schedules, their medical histories, and their lack of action before the collision, both crew members on the striking coal train had fallen asleep due to fatigue.”
The NTSB also concluded that the absence of Positive Train Control (PTC) contributed to the accident, although it likely would have not prevented this particular accident, which occurred while the BNSF coal train was governed by restricted speed operating rules.
Additionally, the absence of crashworthiness standards for modular locomotive cabs contributed to the severity of damage to the locomotive cab of the striking coal train.
In responding to the release of the NTSB’s Report, BLET National President Dennis R. Pierce said: “While we applaud the Board’s acknowledgement of the unacceptable risks posed by crew fatigue, the Report published on April 17 should have expanded on the fact that the accident occurred during the circadian trough, and that the crew was operating into the direction of a rising sun. Any experienced locomotive engineer or trainman can tell you that these particular operating environments pose an identifiable risk when operating at restricted speed.
“The NTSB also failed to address the other issues concerning restricted speed operations — including harassment of crews for operating too slowly at restricted speed — that we raised in our response to Safety Recommendation R-11-10, which was issued in connection with this accident and four others,” Pierce added. “And we remain unwavering in our opposition to NTSB’s reiterated recommendation that railroads be required to install inward-facing video cameras and engage in constant surveillance of operating crews for disciplinary purposes.”