WASHINGTON, D.C. — The National Transportation Safety Board issued the following railroad accident report today:
Executive Summary: On Saturday, May 27, 2000, about 11:48 a.m., central daylight time, 33 of the 113 cars making up eastbound Union Pacific Railroad train QFPLI-26 derailed near Eunice, Louisiana. Of the derailed cars, 15 contained hazardous materials and 2 contained hazardous materials residue. The derailment resulted in a release of hazardous materials with explosions and fire. About 3,500 people were evacuated from the surrounding area, which included some of the business area of Eunice. No one was injured during the derailment of the train or the subsequent release of hazardous materials. Total damages exceeded $35 million.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the May 27, 2000, derailment of Union Pacific train QFPLI-26 was the failure of a set of joint bars that had remained in service with undetected and uncorrected defects because of the Union Pacific Railroad’s ineffective track inspection procedures and inadequate management oversight.
The major safety issues identified in this investigation are track conditions on the Union Pacific’s Beaumont Subdivision and the effectiveness of the Union Pacific’s track inspection activities, including management oversight.
As a result of the investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes safety recommendations to the Federal Railroad Administration, the Union Pacific Railroad, and the Association of American Railroads.
The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following safety recommendations to the Department of Transportation: Develop, with the assistance of the Environmental Protection Agency and Occupational Safety and Health Administration, safety requirements that apply to the loading and unloading of railroad tank cars, highway cargo tanks, and other bulk containers that address the inspection and maintenance of cargo transfer equipment, emergency shutdown measures, and personal protection requirements. (I-02-1) Implement, after the adoption of safety requirements developed in response to Safety Recommendation I-02-1, an oversight program to ensure compliance with these requirements. (I-02-2).
The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following safety recommendation to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration: Assist the U.S. Department of Transportation in developing safety requirements that apply to the loading and unloading of railroad tank cars, highway cargo tanks, and other bulk containers that address personal protection requirements, emergency shutdown measures, and the inspection and maintenance of cargo transfer equipment. (I-02-3).
The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following safety recommendations to the Environmental Protection Agency: Assist the U.S. Department of Transportation in developing safety requirements that apply to the loading and unloading of railroad tank cars, highway cargo tanks, and other bulk containers that address personal protection requirements, emergency shutdown measures, and the inspection and maintenance of cargo transfer equipment. (I-02-4) Notify all facilities that are required to submit risk management plans to the Environmental Protection Agency that tank car excess flow valves cannot be relied upon to stop leaks that occur during tank car loading and unloading operations and that those companies that have included reliance on such valves in their risk management plans should instead identify and implement other measures that will stop the uncontrolled release of product in the event of a transfer line failure during tank car loading or unloading. (R-02-17).
The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following safety recommendation to the Federal Railroad Administration: Issue a hazardous materials bulletin to warn companies involved in tank car loading and unloading operations that tank car excess flow valves cannot be relied upon to stop leaks that occur during those operations. (R-02-16).