(Bloomberg News circulated the following article by Ripley Watson on July 7.)
WASHINGTON — Union Pacific Corp. and other U.S. railroads should be required to take steps to reduce worker fatigue after a fatal 2004 accident in Texas in which the engineer probably was asleep, a federal board said.
The National Transportation Safety Board urged rail regulators Thursday to develop science-based rules to prevent irregular schedules that reduce alertness and to limit duty time after 12 hours. The board found that a Union Pacific crew caused the June 28, 2004, crash by passing a stop signal, hitting a Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp. train and releasing chlorine gas.
The train was bound for Tucson when it hit the Burlington Northern train, which was headed for Tulsa, Okla., and was moving to a side track about 15 miles from San Antonio.
Union Pacific employs about 900 workers in Southern Arizona.
Three people died after inhaling the gas from a tank car punctured in the collision. The accident happened about two hours after the crew reported for duty. The engineer worked 37 of the 55 hours before his shift and still was within federal rules limiting duty time, NTSB investigator Gerald Weeks said.
“It seems amazing to me that we are in this point in time and we don’t have better management of employee schedules,” board member Deborah Hersman said at the Washington hearing. “The crew is being asked to get more rest when they are off duty, but they have no control over when they are called for duty.”
The board’s recommendations to the Transportation Department’s Federal Railroad Administration aren’t binding. The rail agency sets and enforces industry safety rules, including duty limits that require eight hours of rest after as many as 12 hours of work, and 10 hours off if duty time exceeds 12 hours.
The railroad administration will give railroads a technical report on fatigue as early as August that will include methods to calculate tiredness that draw on studies by the Defense Department and others, agency spokesman Steve Kulm said.
The Union Pacific crew in the Texas accident worked irregular schedules and watched movies or played cards instead of getting enough rest before going on duty, Weeks said. The NTSB didn’t identify the crew members.
The conductor failed to alert the engineer when the train passed a warning signal at 45 miles per hour instead of 30 mph or tell him to stop at a red signal, and the engineer didn’t slow down, Weeks said.
The engineer told investigators he didn’t remember anything about the trip. The conductor’s blood-alcohol level exceeded federal limits when he reported for work, Robert Chipkevich, director of the safety board’s railroad office, said. All railroads forbid alcohol consumption on duty. The companies don’t have rules that limit drinking before work.
“While we agree generally that the accident was caused by human factors, we cannot comment fully on the board’s investigation until we review the actual findings and conclusions in detail,” said Union Pacific spokesman James Barnes. The company is the biggest U.S. railroad by sales.
The board also recommended that workers receive training in finding more time to sleep when they are off duty and that railroads be required to install crash-prevention technology.
Technology called “positive train control” would have prevented the collision, said Mark Rosenker, the board’s acting chairman. The satellite-based technology lets a dispatcher halt a train if it passes a stop signal.
Burlington Northern is using such a system on a 124-mile line in Southern Illinois. Union Pacific, Amtrak and the Federal Railroad Administration also are testing the technology in Illinois for use on trains between Chicago and St. Louis.
The safety board again recommended putting tank cars toward the rear of trains to reduce the risk of puncture in a collision. The chlorine car in the Union Pacific accident was 12 cars back from the engines and had 62 loads behind it.